Among the factors contributing to the inability of environmental and economic interest
institutional procedures for resolving environmental conflicts. Because most environmental dilemmas in the United States are resolved through the legal system, this procedure is the primary focus. We also consider the social psychological dynamics most likely to arise in free-market-based proposals, which are becoming more and more prominent. We close by considering hybrid procedures that may avoid the primary limitations of both purely adjudicatory and purely market-based approaches.
BACKGROUND: A MIXED-MOTIVE FRAMEWORK
Economic and environmental interests are neither perfectly opposed nor perfectly aligned. Any given conflict between environmental and economic interest groups involves a number of distinct issues and subissues that can be settled in various ways. Because some issues are valued more by one party than the opposing party, parties can trade concessions on different issues. There are better and worse trades that can be made, and hence some packages of issue settlements serve the collective interest better than do others. As in Hoffman et al. (1999) , we can represent this conception of environmental dilemmas as mixed-motive conflicts. As Figure 1 illustrates, the possible settlements vary not in how the "pie" of value is divided (the distributive dimension that distinguishes settlements C and B from A) but in the size of the pie (the integrative dimension on which D dominates A). An important concept in this framework is that any settlements that dominate both parties' alternatives are mutually beneficial agreements. In other words, the zone of possible agreements lies to the right and above the lines marking the best alternatives of the two parties.
The notion that certain possible agreements are efficient settlements involves the integrative dimension of the diagram. One settlement is more efficient than another by the standard of pareto dominance if it makes at least one party better off without making the other party worse off (e.g., in Figure 1 , both D and F are pareto superior to A). Pareto dominance is a normative standard for negotiation decisions that have been offered as a prescriptive standard for wise negotiation decisions (Bazerman & Neale, 1992) . The set of points that are not Pareto dominated are all efficient. According to this standard, seeking a "wise" settlement implies finding any point on the frontier of Pareto efficiency, not a unique, privileged, Solomonic solution. 1 Research on behavior in mixed-motive conflicts has elucidated the steps parties take to resolve a conflict efficiently (Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1989) . A first step is to comprehend the facts of the conflict. In particular, without understanding the facts determining one's alternative to a negotiated agreement, one cannot determine which settlements are in one's interest. If negotiators overestimate their alternatives, they will fail to recognize settlement options that are in their interest (see Figure 2 , top panel). A second step is to comprehend the interests of other parties in the conflict. Without an understanding of how interests differ between parties, negotiators cannot locate the trade-offs to discover settlement options (see Figure 2 , middle panel). A final step is to evaluate the different settlement options in order to decide on the option that maximizes one's utility. If fairness concerns lead negotiators to reject all settlement options except those that favor both parties equally, then this may rule out the most efficient settlements (see Figure 2 , bottom panel). In sum, the mixed-motive framework brings to our discussion of environmental conflict resolution a clearer picture of the destination-an efficient settlement-and the steps in the journey toward this destination.
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSTACLES
Social psychology research focuses on the thoughts, motives, and feelings that influence human interaction. Researchers have identified tendencies that interfere with each step of the process of efficient conflict resolution. For instance, a barrier to comprehending the facts of an environmental conflict is the tendency to resolve uncertainty or complexity in a way that supports one's prior beliefs. A barrier to comprehending interests in an environmental conflict is the tendency to prejudge the interests of an opponent to be entirely opposed to one's own, exaggerating the actual differences. A problem in decision making is the tendency to reject settlements that serve one's interests because they seem to benefit the opponent to an unfair extent. We will first describe these social psychological tendencies in the abstract, paying attention to underlying causes and potential remedies. Then, we will describe how these dynamics play out concretely in the context of conflict resolution procedures. As we shall see, these social psychological dynamics can pose a barrier in many kinds of conflicts, but they are particularly relevant to environmental conflicts because they are accentuated by the presence of partisan groups.
COMPREHENDING THE FACTS OF A CONFLICT
A distinctive feature of environmental dilemmas is that the value of settlements and alternatives depends on a set of complex and uncertain facts. To estimate the environmental or economic impact of a development proposal, one must work with data from inexact and probabilistic sciences. Such data determine not only magnitude of direct costs and benefits associated with a development but also the time frame, the effectiveness of ameliorative measures, and so on (Messick, 1991; Rubin, 1993; Tensbrunsel, 1999) . By itself, uncertainty about the facts is not fatal to efficient negotiation of conflicts. The barrier to efficient settlements lies in the fact that people in a conflict rarely accept the facts as uncertain and instead strive to reach a certain interpretation by emphasizing some data, discounting other data, and drawing inferences. Because people in conflicts have a strong motive to believe that their positions are correct, they resolve complexity or uncertainty in ways that favor their position. One manifestation of this is the egocentric tendency to selectively attend to and remember issues that support one's position (see Bazerman & Neale, 1982; Sandelands & Calder, 1984; Thompson & Kelley, 1981) . Another manifestation is to trace self-serving patterns of cause and effect through the given events. Each side takes credit for positive outcomes but shirks the blame for negative outcomes (Miller & Ross, 1975; Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfield, 1978) . Negative actions by one's side are interpreted as reactions to prior instigatory actions by the opposing side. This dynamic has been studied in conflicts as diverse as football games (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954) , romantic relationships (Swann, Pelham, & Roberts, 1987) , and international confrontations (Kahn & Kramer, 1990) .
Biases in comprehending the facts can be illustrated by the way environmental groups and industry supporters have handled the issue of air pollution. The two sides attend to differing sets of issues and interpret the data differently.
For instance, a recent study of pollution levels in Texas (Richards, 1998 ) was a focal point for environmentalist arguments that air pollution levels were intolerably high, yet the fact of a slight decrease from previous years was taken as evidence against a problem by industry supporters. Likewise, when estimating the economic costs of reducing carbon emissions, different groups produced sharply different projections. After the Clinton administration estimated the cost of a 7% decrease in carbon emissions in the United States, another government agency with different constituents, the Energy Information Administration (1998), took different issues into account and estimated that costs would instead be 10 to 70 times greater.
Self-serving construals of the facts interfere with conflict resolution in two important ways. First, when negotiators overestimate their alternatives, they fail to appreciate some of the settlements that are in their interest. For example, oil companies have often made the mistake of failing to negotiate with environmental groups based on the confidence that their own interpretation of the facts would be shared by the judicial system. This overconfidence is exemplified in tendencies to dismiss each other's empirical claims. For instance, oil companies regard many empirical findings raised by environmentalists as "pseudo facts" ("U.S. Oil," 1998). Second, differing and self-serving interpretations of factual matters ensnare negotiators in acrimonious debates about facts, forestalling the exchange of information about interests that is needed for the discovery of efficient settlements.
A Remedy Based on Bridging Differences
One solution for disagreements about facts is to have the scientific community act as a third party and impartially study the question in dispute (Campbell, 1969) . That is, scientific data, although not guaranteed to remove all disagreements, should bring the two groups closer to a common understanding. However, because scientific data are rarely unambiguous in their value and meaning, groups have to evaluate and interpret the new data. If this evaluation and interpretation is guided by preexisting beliefs and motives, then the new data may lead each side to strengthen its preexisting beliefs and attitudes. This polarization rather than convergence in response to scientific findings was observed in a study that presented pro-and anti-capital punishment partisans' studies concerning the effectiveness of capital punishment as a crime deterrent (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979) . Participants read two scientific studies based on different methods, each method limited in a different way. In their evaluations, partisans tended to find whichever study supported their view to be more methodologically sound and convincing. Hence, the provision of scientific data to resolve conflicts will not work if partisans discount results that do not support their views.
There are many examples of polarization in response to new scientific information, in part because environmental data are often equivocal. In the early 1990s, scientists introduced data from satellite measurements to support the argument that the earth has been cooling rather than warming. However, in 1998, another group of scientists argued that the data had not been adjusted for changes in the altitude of the satellites, and that such adjustments yielded evidence that the earth is in fact warming. Currently, both groups stand by their divergent interpretations of the same satellite data, as do oil industry and environmental spokespersons ("Science and Technology," 1998) . Other recent studies have convinced environmentalists that current levels of carbon emissions will lead to dramatic increases in global temperatures (Litvin, 1998) . Their opponents, on the other hand, argue that the very models used to make such predictions have a wide margin of error and fail to incorporate feedback effects, and hence do not provide sufficient evidence to justify action (Lindzen, 1998) .
A Remedy Based on Highlighting Differences
Highlighting differences in understanding may actually help resolve conflicts. Morris, Larrick, Thompson, and Su (1999) argued that negotiators who expect that their opponents' beliefs are based on a different knowledge set are less likely to become entangled in arguments about the facts and, instead, will be more focused on learning about their opponents' assumptions and interests. In a study testing this idea, participants in roles representing a municipal environmental board and a developer group negotiated the terms of a green condominium development called Wetland Estates. Before negotiating, participants read detailed materials explaining the background, beliefs, and interests of the group they represented. Then, participants were presented with "scientific facts" about how development affects wetlands. These were abstracts of two scientific studies, each with its own methodological limitations. In the different-facts condition, opposing negotiators read abstracts of different studies, with each negotiator reading a study supporting his or her preexisting view. Each knew that the other had read a different study. In the same-facts condition, both negotiators received both abstracts-one supporting their view and one opposing their view. Again, each knew the other had read the same two studies. After reading about the scientific facts, participants indicated their strategy for the upcoming negotiation. As predicted, negotiators in the different-facts condition were more likely to choose the strategy of asking questions to collect information-information about the opponent's factual beliefs, arguments, and attitudes. By contrast, negotiators in the same-facts condition were more likely to choose the strategy of persuasion. Differing strategies ultimately led to differing outcomes. Different-facts dyads were more likely to discover exchanges of differentially valued issues and, thereby, achieve efficient settlements.
In summary, research suggests that negotiators fail to comprehend the facts in conflicts because of biases to construe information in a self-serving manner. One solution to this problem is to provide both sides with information from scientific studies. Yet, this approach often fails because the parties are, once again, self-serving in how they construe the new information. More encouraging results come from the more oblique approach of increasing parties'expectations that beliefs will differ. Negotiators who expect diversity in opinion are more likely to enter a negotiation asking questions; subsequently, they are more likely to uncover differences in interests.
COMPREHENDING THE INTERESTS OF OTHER PARTIES
The second step required to reach efficient settlements is to comprehend the interests of other parties. Comprehending another's interests is necessary for finding optimal trade-offs. Yet, negotiators are often mistaken in their attributions about the other party. Often, negotiators presume that the other's interests are the inverse of their own. For example, developers who see their own interests as favoring growth or business often attribute anti-growth or anti-business interests to environmental groups, attributions that miss the essence of the environmentalists' interests (Moss, 1998) . Negotiators also make sweeping attributions about an opponent's personal dispositions that inhibit negotiation progress. For example, when supporters of development portray environmentalists as "anticapitalists uncomfortable with the industrialized world" (Sanders & Helgeson, 1998) , they make it more difficult for the two sides to feel that there is enough common ground on which to negotiate. Likewise, the attribution by environmentalists that money is "the only language that they understand" ("California Environmental," 1998) has fostered a strategy of adversarial lawsuits rather than cooperative negotiations. Social psychological research has identified several mechanisms that lead to such mistaken attributions.
Presuppositions of Incompatibility
Negotiators tend to make the assumption that their opponents' interests are opposite to their own. They often fail to discover that both sides' preferences on some issues are in fact the same (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996) . This might occur in an environmental negotiation, for example, if both a developer and an environmental planning board prefer to block public access to a beach. If neither clearly articulates this preference, each might initially assume the opponent wants the opposite. In a strategically reticent interaction, these false assumptions might remain undisconfirmed. Consequently, the two parties might agree to allow restricted beach access, each party thinking of this as a concession valuable to the other. In such a negotiation, the most efficient settlements, which involve blocking access entirely, are never discovered.
Some insight about solutions to this problem comes from experiments testing the efficacy of interventions before a negotiation to mitigate exaggerated perception of incompatibility. Keltner and Robinson (1993) found that when both parties described their ideological views in a noncontentious way prior to negotiation, negotiators reached more integrative solutions, perhaps because they perceived each party's interests more accurately and saw potential tradeoffs. Subsequent research by Puccio and Ross (1998) found a similar benefit to having both parties describe the "most legitimate and convincing" arguments on the other side.
Naive Realism
A second source of biased attributions about negotiation opponents is that people are naive realists about their everyday perceptions (Asch, 1952) . That is, people fail to appreciate the extent to which their perceptions of events are not simply copies of objective reality but are constructions built from the scaffolding of prior knowledge. In conflicts, people encounter others who are likely to hold different perceptions of the same events, and their naive realism makes it hard for them to understand that both parties have formed their perceptions through interpretation. Instead, people tend to infer that the other's beliefs must be based on illogical or insincere reasoning (Griffin, Dunning, & Ross, 1990) . Ross and Ward (1995) argued that because of this, we tend to see conflict opponents as unreasonable, as incapable or unwilling to sort out the facts objectively rather than through the lens of their ideology. Such attributions, naturally, reduce one's willingness to share information with an opponent.
A possible remedy for this bias builds on the aforementioned proposal of that there are benefits to leading negotiators to assume that an opponent's conclusions are based on a different set of data. This assumption provides an explanation for why the opponent's perceptions differ from our own and removes the need to attribute negative dispositions to the opponent. Morris et al. (1999, Experiment 2) tested this remedy by having participants take the side of either the environment or development in a negotiation over the terms of a municipal permit for an offshore aquaculture plant. Before negotiating participants learned their roles and then read abstracts of several studies. Participants in same-facts and different-facts conditions actually read the same set of environmental impact studies; the manipulation was whether participants expected their opponent had seen the same set of studies. As predicted, negotiators who assumed their opponent had seen different facts tended to judge their opponents as more sincere, open, and candid, not biased, dogmatic, and unreasonable. In sum, preventative measures that raise awareness that the opponent works from a different experience base reduces negotiators' tendency to make negative attributions.
Correspondence Bias
Another source of bias in attributions is the tendency to overlook situational causes of an opponent's actions and instead trace these actions to correspondent dispositions. This tendency has been central to models of social perception for decades (Heider, 1958) and has been called the "fundamental attribution error" (Ross, 1977) . Correspondence bias is most likely under the conditions of a busy perceiver observing an actor in a highly constraining social situation (Gilbert & Malone, 1995) . Morris and colleagues have argued that that these conditions are present in conflicts and negotiations. The pressure of bargaining forces certain actions (e.g., refusals or demands), and these actions tend to be misread as reflecting personality dispositions (inflexibility or demanding). The result is a bias to perceive opponents as having a personality that is generally uncooperative (in terms of trait modes, low agreeableness). In several studies of disputes, Morris, Leung, and Sethi (1996) found that these personality attributions are common and predict the choices made about how to resolve the dispute. Morris, Larrick, and Su (in press) found that perceived uncooperativeness was a function of the opponent's bargaining position; the tighter the bargaining zone, the more one's opponent is perceived as having an uncooperative or lowagreeableness character. These personality attributions, in turn, shaped participants'subsequent interactions with the opponent. Participants who perceived an opponent as uncooperative decided not to enter interactions requiring cooperation (i.e., negotiations) with that person in the future. An example of this dynamic is provided by a recent study of conflicts between environmental and accounting managers in British firms (Wycherley, 1997) . The actions of accountants, constrained by clearly demarcated accounting systems, often led environmental managers to perceive them as inflexible and uncooperative, and to avoid involving them in problem solving.
Again, research on the mechanism that underlies this bias has led to research identifying a possible solution. Larrick, Morris, and Su (1999) noticed that a boundary condition for the phenomenon occurs when the bargaining zone is negative. When the lacuna between opposing offers makes it plain that the bargaining situation allows no mutually acceptable agreements, negotiators "agree to disagree" and part without negative impressions of each other. This suggests that attributions of uncooperativeness can be mitigated by providing opponents with information about each other's alternative. Although this cannot be done during a negotiation for strategic reasons, often it can be done after a deal is struck. An empirical test of postnegotiation information as a solution confirmed that reliable information about an opponent's bargaining position can preempt trait attributions (Larrick et al., 1999, Experiment 3) .
FAIRNESS CONCERNS IN DECISION MAKING
Sometimes negotiators reject the settlements that hold most value because of the manner in which they benefit other parties. Although from a narrow standpoint of rational decision making that parties should be concerned only with their own outcome, in practice negotiators base decisions on concerns about other parties'outcomes and about how these outcomes compare. Although some concerns about others are driven by motives such as enmity or empathy, often, concern for relative outcomes involves the psychology of fairness. For instance, in a recent incident an environmental group engineered a third-party land swap in which it would buy ecologically sensitive land from a developer and nonsensitive land from the U.S. Forest Service (at the same price) and resell the nonsensitive land to the developer and the sensitive land to the U.S. Forest Service. This exchange was designed to benefit both parties. However, concerns that the deal was inequitable were raised in both the environmental and public arenas when it was discovered that the land the developers received had a higher market value than the land they exchanged. Such complaints eventually prompted a government ban on third-party transactions (Christensen, 1998) . In this example, we see two sides to the obstacle of fairness concerns-first, that fairness concerns can lead parties to reject valuable offers, and second, that parties often disagree about the standard of fairness that applies.
The basic concern for fairness that guides decision making in negotiation has been studied by psychologists interested in social utility (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989; Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995) . In experiments with the ultimatum game, most people choose to block a deal and receive nothing rather than to accept a valuable but inequitable offer (Roth & Murnighan, 1982) . Examples of such decisions can be seen in the actions of environmental groups to stop green oil drilling developments in the rainforest that seem to do more for the oil company than for the environment, even though alternative developers may make no concessions to the environment (Salter & Hall, 1995) .
Although we have sought to describe remedies for other social psychological dynamics that impede efficiency in environmental conflict resolution, this is inappropriate in the case of the basic concern for fairness, since fairness is a characteristic of conflict resolution outcomes that can be as important as efficiency. Some theorists of negotiation have advocated reliance on principles of fairness in order to achieve efficiency (Fischer & Ury, 1981) . Sometimes this is possible. A standard of fairness may lead a party to make the concessions necessary for an efficient outcome to be reached. Yet, perhaps just as often it has the opposite effect. The real value of fairness as a standard in negotiation may involve not the efficiency but the sustainability of an outcome. In our view, fairness and efficiency are independently valuable characteristics of settlements that are sometimes at odds.
Negotiators often disagree about how fairness should be interpreted. Fairness is not always conceptualized in terms of the equality rule that the settlement benefit each side by the same amount. Developers, thinking in business terms, generally construe fairness in terms of equity (to each according to contributions). Yet, when basic resources such as clean water are at stake, the standard of need (to each according to needs) often seems more appropriate to environmental representatives. Hence, the differing backgrounds and perspectives of developers and environmentalists lead to different construals of fairness.
Another source of divergence in construals of fairness is the tendency to resolve ambiguity in a self-serving manner (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid 1978 ; for a review of environmental implications, see Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1997) . This involves the questions of which standard applies and how the standard should be interpreted. Consider, for example, the conflict over a proposed system of globally exchangeable pollution permits, which would allow countries to meet their emissions quotas by buying permits from other countries. This proposal was presented as a fair solution to a global problem by U.S. negotiators, but it was vigorously opposed by representatives of less wealthy countries because it would allow the worst (but wealthiest) polluters to avoid aggressive emissions reductions domestically (Butler, 1998 ). An alternative proposal is to set equally stringent emissions limits across countries; however, this has been objected to by developing countries on the argument that not only current pollution levels but past pollution levels must be taken into account when applying the equality standard. Representatives of developing countries argue that the currently high levels of global carbon dioxide have been caused by highly industrialized countries, and hence these countries are entitled to less future pollution than the countries of the developing world (Young & Wolf, 1992) .
Researchers are investigating ways to remedy the tendency toward self-serving fairness concerns. To a large extent, self-serving interpretations arise from people making judgments mindlessly, without questioning themselves. Researchers have demonstrated that simple manipulations that make people self-aware have been effective in reducing self-serving tendencies (Greenberg, 1983) . Hence, symbolic environmental activism may help increase the self-awareness of developers. Another approach involves persuading negotiators to think of their opponents-to take the other's perspective-before judging what is fair. Drolet, Larrick, and Morris (1998) found that thinking of others reduces self-serving perceptions of fairness in a positive relationship but not in a negative relationship. This suggests that building an interpersonal bond between opposing negotiators may be a solution to the problem of differing standards of fairness.
OBSTACLES IN THE CONTEXT OF PROCEDURES
In the previous section, we presented a decontextualized analysis of problematic social psychological dynamics. A full understanding requires an analysis of how such tendencies arise within the context of particular institutionalized procedures for resolving conflicts between environmental and development interests. We will examine two institutional procedures for resolving such conflicts: third-party decrees to resolve most environmental disputes currently, and an influential proposal for private market contracts. The procedures may encounter different kinds of obstacles.
THE TRADITIONAL PROCEDURE: GOVERNMENTAL ADJUDICATION
Conflicts between economic and environmental interests in the United States are often resolved through procedures in which a governmental authority makes a binding decision that applies broadly, at a national or regional level. Rather than a direct negotiation between the individual parties proximally affected by particular environmental harms or economic benefits, the final decision-making authority is given to a third party-a legislature or a court that renders regulations or legal precedents that affect broad sectors of society. In theory, efficient outcomes can be reached to the extent that legislators or judges gain an understanding that approximates "perfect information" about the costs and benefits associated with a particular type of pollution. To the extent that the third-party authority is well informed and motivated, it has the ability to produce decrees so that, on average, the costs of the marginal unit of pollution equal the benefits and, thus, maximize social welfare. However, practice is often quite different from theory. In analyzing how conflict resolution through these procedures is hindered by social psychological barriers, it is helpful to consider both the process (third-party arbitration) and the form of settlement (broad regulations and precedent-setting interpretations).
Third-party authorities are rarely as well informed about a particular dispute as the principal parties themselves. Moreover, arbitrative procedures in general do not create strong incentives for fact finding (see Lewicki & Litterer, 1985) . Arbitrators very often focus on producing impartial, and not necessarily efficient, solutions. Also, because the arbitrator can unilaterally impose a settlement, environmental and development interests are not required to negotiate directly with each other to establish a mutually agreed upon settlement. Each side accomplishes its goals by influencing the arbitrator, not by finding common ground on which to negotiate with the opposing side or by coming to an understanding of the other side's interests.
A second important feature of legal procedures is that settlements take the form of general, precedent-setting rules that apply broadly across an industry or region. For example, regulations stipulate the maximum concentration of a toxin that can be emitted by all factories in an industry. Similarly, the legal system recognizes that certain types of behaviors are unlawfully harmful to others and adjudicates appropriately. Such decrees limit (or protect) the extent to which any party can engage in certain types of behavior. For the most part, such outcomes are marked by the absence of exchange between the disputing parties. The party whose activity is constrained by a new decree is not compensated for the additional restraints placed on it. Each action to make the limits more stringent implies losses to all developer parties and benefits to all environmental parties, pitting the two parties against each other and creating large interest groups. With these features in mind, let us now consider how social psychological obstacles arise.
Understanding the Facts
We have described dynamics that lead parties to simplify the factual complexity of issues by interpreting information in light of prior beliefs. In the context of legal adjudication, the tendency of the disputing parties to make selfserving interpretations of the facts often leads to overly optimistic goals that play out in mutually costly legal battles. Furthermore, misunderstandings of the facts by the third-party arbitrator can be disastrous. This is because the arbitrator is placed in the role of ascertaining the costs and benefits of economic behaviors, which in turn determine the nature of the settlement. Comprehension of the environmental and economic facts is hindered in arbitration procedures. First, arbitration as a decision-making process creates little incentive for the disputing parties to be realistic in their presentations of the facts. As research has observed, there is a strategic incentive for each side to exaggerate its claims and demands (Bloom, 1986; Farber, 1981; Neale & Bazerman, 1987) , which distorts the facts as understood by both the principals and the third party. Research also shows that procedures that induce participants to make extreme statements can lead them to become convinced of the contents of these statements. The classic studies of Janis and colleagues (Janis & King, 1954; Janis & Mann, 1965) observed that individuals, instructed to make a speech espousing a view they actually oppose, tended to become more supportive of the view after having delivered the speech.The public nature of legal contests makes it even more likely that parties on both sides will become committed to their extreme claims (Cialdini, 1984) .
Second, the fact that these procedures provide settlements in the form of laws and general precedents also works against a determination of facts. The key factor here is that general rules create an incentive for the formation of broad partisan groups. Whereas a particular dispute may involve only a small number of parties (e.g., a noisy factory and the adjacent meditation center), a legal solution affects many parties and thereby creates large interest groups (e.g., all factories of this type and all their neighbors, respectively). Consider, for instance, the lobbying groups that have formed to influence legislation and adjudication concerning air pollution. On the development side are groups such as the Global Climate Coalition, which represents over 50 companies and trade associations in the oil, coal, utility, chemical, and auto industries and spends nearly $1 million per year to advance its interests. Joining this endeavor are other industry groups such as the International Climate Change Partnership and the Business Council for a Sustainable Energy Future (Levy, 1997) . Attempting to influence Congress to adopt more stringent legislation on the environmental side is a green lobby that includes organizations from the Sierra Club to the League of Conservation Voters (Harrison, 1982) .
Dynamics within such broad interest groups magnify the social psychological tendencies to distort and simplify the facts. Groups exert pressure on members to conform in opinion (Asch, 1951) . To avoid sanctioning, members self-censor statements that they believe will contradict the group opinion. Members of the group often fail to recognize that others are also engaging in the selfcensoring behavior and hence feel validated in their silence-because others have not raised their objection, they must find the objections groundless. As a consequence, group interaction leads to the polarization of beliefs and attitudes (Stoner, 1968) . Moreover, members of lobbying groups spend a significant amount of time together planning and organizing to promote the common legislative goal. As a result, these individuals are exposed to a biased sample of the issues, a sample that makes available the points supporting their stated goals and neglects the points opposing them. In sum, the lobbying groups that emerge make it more unlikely that parties will achieve an accurate understanding of the facts.
Understanding Other Parties
Efficient conflict resolution requires the comprehension of the interests of the other parties in the conflict. The context of arbitrative procedures often exacerbates the tendencies we have identified that interfere with perceptions of other parties. First, because the settlement is yielded to a third party rather than decided by the disputing parties themselves, disputants are required to enter into direct communication and cooperation with each other (Deutsch, 1973) . Without this direct contact, parties have little opportunity to disconfirm their negative perceptions of each other. Beyond this, the lobbying efforts that surround legislation and lawsuits often involve negative campaigning. Instead of withholding negative comments about the opponent (which is often done in private disputes to avoid antagonizing the opponent), negative comments are likely to be aired strategically. This tendency can be observed in the debate over environmental policy, where groups often present themselves as serving the public interest and the opposition as serving illegitimate interests. Development interests allege that environmentalists represent only a small fraction of radicals, whereas environmental interests allege that supporters of development represent only their own concentrated financial interests. Both sides have charged that lobby groups on the opposing side prevent more moderate voices from being heard (Hamilton & Hoch, 1997; Harrison, 1982) . Business leaders see pro-environmental proposals as "radical documents that have been sold to well-meaning people by those who are virulently anti-growth" (Moss, 1998, p. 823) . Environmental groups have strikingly similar perceptions of developers; for example, characterizing a prodevelopment initiative as "merely a wise disguise for a well-financed industrybacked campaign that preys upon the economic woes and fears of U.S. citizens" (Brick, 1995, p. 19) .
Other obstacles to the process of perceiving other parties'interests arise in the form of settlements in the legal system. As we have noted, the law tends to cast a particular case in terms of a more general rule that affects a broad segment of society. There is a well-documented tendency for members of partisan groups to overestimate the extent of differences between their own interests and those of other parties. Robinson, Keltner, Ward, and Ross (1995) demonstrated this in studies of opposed partisan groups in a number of social conflicts. For example, in one study, pro-life or pro-choice partisans in the abortion debate consistently overestimated the degree of difference in policy preferences between their own group and the opposing group. One reason partisan groups are misperceived is that spokespersons for each group tend to be extremists. A second reason is that persuasion attempts naturally focus on issues of disagreement rather than agreement. A final reason is that demands by coalitions reflect the least common denominator of agreement on interests among members. For example, even though many individual interests in business coalitions might favor some form of agreement on carbon emissions legislation, the coalition as a whole adopts a less flexible position (Levy, 1997) . Unfortunately, these skewed perceptions make it difficult to structure laws and legal judgments that reconcile supporters of the environment with supporters of development. For instance, the Clean Air Act, originally enacted by Congress in 1977, was amended in 1990 after 10 years of arduous debate and testimony in Congress. Many times in its history, interested parties had advocated changes to flawed provisions in the law but were unsuccessful because of the difficulty of understanding and incorporating the interests involved ("Clean Air," 1998; Guttmann, Sierck, & Friedland, 1992) .
Fairness Concerns
The final barrier to the efficient resolution of conflicts is the concern for fairness that guides choices between settlements. Fairness concerns in negotiation often lead one party to block a settlement because it favors another party more. A virtue of adjudicatory procedures, however, is that fairness concerns can be somewhat alleviated by the perceived impartiality of the third-party decision maker. The classic studies of Thibaut and Walker (1975) found that perceptions of fairness are highest in "adversary adjudication" procedures that yield decision control to a third party while retaining control over the presentation of arguments for the disputants, as in a legislative or legal hearing. The more recent work of Tyler and Lind (1988, 1992) has emphasized that not only the formal structure of the procedure but also the way it is personally enacted contributes to the perception of fair process and ultimately to acceptance of and commitment to a solution. Thus, the legislators, officials, and judges who enact the regulatory systems may also promote favorable reactions by emphasizing their neutrality and their attention to the interests of the parties involved in the conflict.
Moreover, the fact that outcomes take the form of a general rule has a similarly favorable impact on perceptions of fairness. A general decree that treats all polluters alike seems inherently fair. Most conceptions of fairness or justice, at least in Western societies, are universalistic rather than particularistic (Morris & Leung, 1999) . In sum, fairness concerns are allayed by the process and form of legal judgments.
Summary
The greatest obstacles preventing efficient solutions in third-party decree procedures are the dynamics that impede perception of the facts and of other parties rather than the fairness concerns that impede rational decision making. These arbitrative procedures exacerbate the psychological tendencies that obscure perception of facts and interests and, ultimately, impede the discovery of efficient settlement options. As we shall see, alternative market-based procedures enable the discovery of efficient solutions but may encounter fairness concerns that prevent these efficient solutions from being adopted.
AN ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE: MARKET CONTRACTS
The use of regulations to resolve conflicts is often criticized on the grounds of efficiency. In particular, economists object to the fact that regulations preclude exchanges between producers that would be of mutual benefit. That is, the costs of abating a particular environmental harm may be higher for certain producers than for others. Because the same limits are placed on each party, the system does not allow abatement activities to be distributed primarily to producers whose costs of abatement are lower. Environmental savings are missed because once a party has met the requirements of the regulation, there is no incentive to further reduce environmental harm, even if such abatement could be accomplished at low cost. In sum, each unit of pollution abatement is accomplished at a higher than necessary economic cost to producers as a group, and the perception of higher than necessary costs is part of what energizes anti-regulatory lobbying.
Many critiques of regulation and proposals about alternative market solutions are inspired by theoretical conjectures of Coase (1960) , who argued that externality problems can be solved via direct negotiations between parties holding the rights to an externality and those desiring to purchase the rights. The central idea of Coase's proposals of free market mechanisms for balancing development and environment interests is that an opportunity to create value exists when the marginal benefit of abating a negative externality is not equivalent to the marginal cost. When the benefit to a downstream party of having less pollution exceeds the cost to the upstream party of abating pollution, then the gain from abatement that can be divided between the two parties to make each better off. In theory, such a conflict can be resolved efficiently by bargaining regardless of which party has the rights over the externality. For instance, imag,ine a situation in which a business has the lawful right to produce a certain type of pollution. In this case, the people harmed by this pollution would have an incentive to compensate the producer to abate the externality. Alternatively, if the laws in the society stipulate that people have the absolute right to forbid pollution, the producer would have an incentive to pay those affected for the right to produce a certain amount of emissions. In either situation, the parties involved have an incentive to negotiate until the marginal benefits are equated with the marginal costs, or, in other words, until social welfare is optimized. Coase's (1960) model is prominent in the discussion of environmental policy in large part because it provides an exposition of the types of efficiency gains possible in a fully unregulated framework. However, such procedures have rarely been implemented. One reason is that the model presumes that transaction costs are low; that is, it is possible to organize all the interested parties, construct a contract, and enforce the contract inexpensively. This economic factor is a limitation to pure market approaches, but social psychological factors also present obstacles. To analyze the social psychological dynamics that may prove troublesome in this procedure, it is once again useful to consider the decisionmaking process, which is negotiation, and the form that settlements take, which is a contract specifying an exchange of environmental property for money.
Understanding the Facts
In a market procedure for balancing environmental and economic interests, decision making occurs through direct negotiation between opposing parties. Opposing sides will likely differ with respect to their perceptions of the harm produced by the externality. To the extent that misperceptions lead to overly optimistic views, negotiators may fail to realize that it is in their interest to accept a particular settlement. Also, disagreements about matters of fact can lead to mistrust and escalation of conflict. Nevertheless, an important feature of the negotiation process at the heart of market-based procedures is that it does not depend on parties' converging in their perceptions of the facts. Negotiators who openly exchange information about interests can reach an efficient settlement even if they have differing or uncertain views of the facts. Moreover, the process of negotiation creates an interaction between disputants that potentially works to correct mistaken views of the facts. This is best seen in contrast with legal procedures in which a third party must decide on a version of facts after hearing conflicting arguments from both sides.
Market procedures mitigate the problem of disagreements in the form of market settlements: the private contract. Consider the common situation of a disagreement between defenders of environmental and economic interests about the future state of the world. A regulator in this situation would find it difficult to optimize the level at which an activity would be restricted. The clauses included in a contract would make future monetary transfers contingent on assessments of the facts. Both sides would be able to "bet" on their differing expectations when designing the contract (see Bazerman & Neale, 1992) . For example, a factory that believes that the pollution it produces will have minimal impact could structure a contingent contract with nearby residents who believe that the pollution would have a large impact. This contract would allow additional payments to residents if the actual harm of the pollution exceeds a certain level. To the extent that this contingency provides a large expected benefit to the residents while imposing a small expected loss to the factory, it increases the chances that the two sides will be able to settle on a contract.
Understanding Interests
For many of the same reasons, market procedures also lessen misperceptions of opposing parties. The direct negotiations between the parties provide an opportunity for the parties to exchange information and to explain their demands in a private context. To the extent that a settlement would allow each party to improve its position vis-à-vis the status quo, there is an economic incentive for both parties to comprehend rather than alienate the other party.
Furthermore, the form of a private contract has an inherent flexibility that works to limit antagonism between parties. For instance, if negotiations with a particular counterpart are overly combative, the owners of a factory may decide to move away from a region and search for others who would be willing to sell pollution rights on more favorable terms. The role of the market in minimizing conflict is even greater if parties make contractual arrangements before committing resources to a particular location. Thus, for example, individuals seeking to build a factory may enter negotiations with many localities to buy the right to pollute. Instead of entering combative negotiations with any particular locality, they may simply opt to contract with the locality that provides the best terms.
Fairness Concerns
Whereas problematic tendencies in social perception are alleviated in free market procedures, fairness concerns present a formidable obstacle. Legal decisions take into account broad societal interests, whereas private negotiations reflect only the interests at the bargaining table. Negotiated exchanges are unlikely to be perceived as fair by parties who feel that they have been left out of the process. Free market procedures may be perceived as fair only for localized environmental conflicts. Our earlier example of the conflict between a noisy factory and the adjacent meditation center involves a localized environmental harm. Because the noise harms only one party, it is easy to hold a negotiation in which all of the relevant parties are represented. An efficient solution may be found, such as a payment to the meditation center that more than covers the cost of soundproof walls. However, in the case of a more general externality, such as a factory that contributes to acid rain, it is more difficult to involve all of the affected parties in a private negotiation. In many disputes, it may be impossible to bring all the rightful stakeholders to the bargaining table. This is because many environmental externalities are nonlocalized in history just as they are nonlocalized in space. Current activities affect future generations of people, and even the most representative process of bringing relevant private parties to the negotiating table is unlikely to be seen as adequately representing future generations (see Wade-Benzoni et al., 1997) .
Other fairness concerns about market solutions arise from the form of settlements-contracts specifying exchanges in rights to the environment. Treating environmental resources as private property connotes that holders of property rights have the right to make use of the property in any way they choose, even if such use conflicts with the wishes of others in the society. In environmental issues, this is a hotly contested issue. Development interests assert that people have the right to be unencumbered in activities on their own property. That is, a lumber company should be able to clear trees on its own property. However, environmental groups are quick to assert that environmental assets are inherently public. They argue, for example, that an endangered species of owls belongs to society as a whole, and that this public right supersedes any private rights. Many feel that the environment should be protected from economic concerns and the operations of the market (Baron & Spranca, 1997) . This position can be defended in terms of ecological philosophy; that is, the environment does not derive its value from its potential for human use, but it must be respected because its very existence is a terminal value (O'Riordan, 1995) .
It is interesting to speculate about further fairness concerns that might arise from the consequences of free market procedures. The implementation of such procedures would start with privatizing some environmental rights. Then, a pattern of exchanges would commence. Groups more willing to accept environmental harms would exchange their rights to a clean environment in return for a monetary payment. The wealthier segments of the population would have greater ability to purchase and appropriate environmental assets. Such a prospect would likely meet with resistance from those who believe that each person deserves equal access to the environment and those who do not trust the wealthy to wisely and unselfishly manage the environment. That such fairness concerns can produce explosive reactions is proven by the uproar created when it was revealed that the chief economist of the World Bank had written in a note, "Just between you and me, shouldn't the World Bank be encouraging more migration of the dirty industries to the LDCs?" (Cairncross, 1992, p. 55) . Equally vehement was the objection raised by Greenpeace over deaths caused by Taiwanese toxic wastes that were shipped to Cambodia for land disposal (Fontaine, 1999) . It is precisely because of such concerns about fairness that federal agencies are currently required to ensure that actions "that substantially affect human health or the environment" not discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin ("Environmental Justice," 1997, p. 21) .
Whereas in current regulatory approaches the government retains much control over how environmental resources are used, a prerequisite of moving to a system of contracts is that clearly defined property rights be given to private parties. One implementation would accord ownership rights to the parties affected by pollution, in which case polluters would have to offer compensation in return for permission to pollute. An alternate implementation would involve distributing rights to polluters, so that those who prefer less pollution would have to pay polluters to change their activities. Either implementation involves a large transfer of wealth, and hence concerns about distributive justice are likely to arise. As justice researchers have pointed out, people's reactions to public policies involve standards related to the appropriate distribution of resources in society (Deutsch, 1985; Tyler, 1984) . The fairness of market procedures would be judged according to standards of fair distribution-equality, equity, need, and so on. For instance, if the system causes wealthier segments of the society (and specifically business interests) to profit more than others, objections may be raised that the society has been made more unequal. If the system distributes in favor of nonbusiness interests, objections may be raised that equity concerns are violated, since the party that has made the greatest investment in the society is not compensated for its contribution. Furthermore, objections based on need concerns may be raised against any outcome that does not distribute more wealth to the poorest segments of society. In sum, any act that redistributes wealth is likely to violate some sort of distributive standard and produce dissatisfaction and charges of injustice from some segment of the population. 
Summary
Although free-market solutions are less hindered by problems of misperceiving facts and interests, they are hindered by fairness concerns. One type of objection involves whether private individuals should have the right to accept or create high levels of environmental harm. Other objections involve concerns about implicit transfers of wealth across different sectors of the society and issues of distributive fairness. In the next section, we describe examples of hybrid procedures that incorporate market mechanisms while forgoing some important proposals of efficiency based on Coase's (1960) conjecture. As a result, these hybrid procedures may avoid fairness objections.
HYBRID PROCEDURES
We have noted social psychological obstacles to efficient solutions that arise in both of the procedural contexts examined in this article. Third-party decree procedures are plagued by the psychological dynamics that interfere with accurate perceptions of facts and interests. As a result, the environmental preservation that is achieved comes at a higher than necessary economic cost, and the procedure often becomes acrimonious and intractable. By contrast, free market procedures would minimize these obstacles to the discovery of efficient solutions, even though they are hindered by fairness concerns. Hybrid procedures have been proposed to capture some of the power of markets to motivate and facilitate the discovery of efficient settlements while preserving much of the perceived fairness and legitimacy of the legal system. We will describe several procedures and analyze their common features.
Exchangeable Pollution Permits
Probably the most prominent hybrid procedure is the system of exchangeable pollution permits that was instituted to limit sulfur dioxide emissions in Southern California. Under this scheme, a cap is placed on the amount of emissions allowed in the region. Each year, producers in the area are issued permits that allow them in the aggregate to pollute up to this limit. All of the allowances are allocated free to incumbent sources. Permits are fully exchangeable and can be "banked" for future use. To promote a true market, a percentage of the permits are auctioned each year by the government, with revenues returned proportionately to the incumbent sources (Joskow, Schmalensee, & Bailey, 1998) . A different variant of this approach, which involves exchanging quota allowances, was instituted in Boston for emissions (Harris, 1993) and in different parts of the country for wastewater effluents (Stephenson, Norris, & Shabman, 1998) . In this system, regulatory limits are applied to all producers; however, a company that reduces pollution below the quota is allowed to sell the difference to others.
Pollution permit systems have been accepted as fair, most likely because of features in common with a legal procedure. The government still sets the aggregate level of pollution in the area. Also, there is no disbursement of property rights or public funds to producers. Yet, these systems have a record of producing efficient outcomes. Because abatement activities can be shifted to those producers for whom the cost of abatement is lowest (thereby lowering the overall cost of compliance to producers), these systems have been supported by the majority of businesses and utilities affected (Harris, 1993) , and, not only development but also environmental interests have been met. Environmental assessments have supported the efficacy of permits systems in producing cleaner air ("SO2 Emissions," 1998).
Exchanges of Greater Harms for Lesser Harms
Although exchangeable permit schemes have been implemented successfully to limit air pollution, they are not appropriate for all types of environmental preservation. Exchangeable permits are suited for controlling the rate at which a harmful activity occurs. For instance, air pollution dissipates with time rather than permanently spoiling the air, so the goal is to limit the rate of emission to lower the atmospheric concentration. However, for land development that destroys natural habitats, the harms do not dissipate with time. For this type of development, a system has emerged based on shifting development activities to areas in which less ecological harm would be produced. One such solution involves allowing holders of ecologically sensitive land to exchange their land for federal land that is less sensitive. Thus, landowners can exchange a piece of land that has many environmental restrictions for one that does not. Such a solution, of course, depends on the availability of idle federal land suited for this use. Another proposed initiative would allow landowners to damage certain habitats as long as they agree to set aside or to buy other portions of land originally slated to be developed (Cohn, 1998) . A similar logic is employed in government initiatives to purchase lands for conservation with revenues from development elsewhere, such as offshore oil drilling (Hebert, 1999) .
Exchange arrangements have many features in common with legal procedures, which preserve legitimacy and perceived fairness. The government continues to regulate development on ecologically sensitive land. Also, because the exchanges do not involve the disbursement of public funds, they avoid the appearance of distributing wealth from one part of society to another. Exchanges employ a market feature to produce a more efficient balance of environmental and economic interests; that is, they allow for mutually beneficial exchanges.
CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed the social psychological dynamics that present obstacles in environmental conflict resolution and the differing institutional procedures that moderate these dynamics. An understanding of obstacles often leads to an understanding of how obstacles can be overcome. Hybrid procedures for environmental conflict resolution work in part by selecting the features of regulatory and market approaches that alleviate particular psychological obstacles. Problematic partisan group dynamics that hamper efficient conflict resolution through regulations are ameliorated, in the systems we have discussed, by permitting individual parties to engage in limited exchanges. Yet, although this market ingredient works against partisanship and encourages accurate perceptions, hybrid systems retain aspects of regulation. The government continues to stipulate the level at which environmentally harmful behaviors can occur, and hence the whole society, through the government, retains control over natural resources. Furthermore, the government acts as neutral third party arbitrating the terms on which a permit market or exchange arrangement occurs. These factors are important for the acceptance of efficient settlements by the parties directly involved and by other observing parties.
In retaining aspects of regulation, hybrid procedures explicitly forgo two types of efficiency in Coase's (1960) model. First, these programs do not allow the market to set the optimal level of environmental preservation for society (by allowing market forces to equate the society-wide marginal costs and benefits of preservation). Second, these programs do not allow for the efficiency that is created when environmental harm is shifted to those who are most willing to endure it. In this way, hybrid procedures avoid the problems of perceived unfairness that arise when wealth is redistributed. Although these systems lower the cost of compliance for businesses, they avoid (and avoid the impression of) providing a windfall to development interests. This is accomplished by eschewing any arrangements that would explicitly transfer money from public coffers to private businesses or developers.
In sum, innovative hybrid procedures for environmental conflict resolution have evolved to avoid the obstacles that have hindered traditional procedures, including social psychological obstacles. However, these procedures are not a panacea and have been applied to only a few industries in only a few regions. An understanding of the trade-offs made by these procedures and their social psychological consequences may be of use in evaluating and managing the further application of these procedures.
NOTES
1. It is useful to keep in mind that Pareto dominance is just one standard for finding wise settlements. Another standard that seems relevant to environmental dilemmas is suggested by classical utilitarian notions of increasing the average welfare of all relevant parties. Such a standard leads to differing evaluations-it would privilege solution D as superior to F because it makes one party appreciably better off while only hurting the other party a little bit. Of course, this standard is more analytically problematic than the Pareto standard because it requires comparing the utility of more than one party on a common metric, a cardinal notion of utility. However, the standard for efficiency that works best in constructing formal theories is not necessarily one that works best in producing wise agreement when translated into a prescriptive decision rule. Moreover, besides the issue of efficiency, the issue of equity or fairness may also be an integral part of the notion of wise settlements.
2. The issue of distributive justice is interesting when one considers whether the standard of pareto dominance serves as a guide to wise settlements. Not only does Pareto dominance fail to explicitly incorporate a concern for equity, it can be inequity preserving in a way that is seldom discussed. To the extent that the status quo involves a distribution of resources that heavily favors of one side of a conflict (such as in a conflict between a well-established development interest and a small, weakly established environmentalist group), it tends to be difficult to find a new settlement that makes one party better off without making the other worse off. To the extent that the current settlement is relatively efficient and to the extent that there are many parties, the problem worsens. In other words, Pareto dominance as a decision rule involves accepting the status quo distribution as a legitimate reference point, so inequity that is present in the status quo agreement can be locked in or perpetuated under the guise of an efficiency-seeking and value-creating approach to conflict resolution.
